John Stockton is one of the most revered point guards in NBA history. He made 11 all-nba teams and is the NBA’s leader in career assists and steals. In a 2006 ESPN vote of 13 analysts, he was ranked the fourth-greatest point guard in basketball history. And yet, Stockton is hardly ever criticized for failing to win a title or for coming up short in big moments, while his teammate, Karl Malone, often is.

Is that narrative accurate?

First, it’s instructional to track the success of the Jazz as a team throughout Stockton’s tenure. Point guards without gaudy scoring stats have a history of quarterbacking the greatest offenses in NBA history, offenses that usually fall apart without their decision-making and constant pressure. Below are the Jazz Offensive Rating (points per 100 possessions) and Defensive Rating relative to league average in the Stock-Malone era (bolded numbers indicate league leader):

1988 – Stockton and Malone

Stockton became the starter in 1988, with a minutes per game jump of 22.7 to 34.7. His per36 numbers jumped from 12 points and 11 assists on 58% True Shooting (TS%), 23% TOV and a 116 Offensive Rating to 13 points and 13 assists on 65% TS, 22% TOV and a 125 ORtg. In other words, it’s a pretty monstruous statistical season and one that gives rise to the argument Stockton is an elite – or super elite? – offensive player. Note that Utah’s offense improved from -4.2 to -1.2. What happened to the rest of the team?

Here was the Jazz rotational changes from 1987 to 1988:

1. Malone 2900 MP → 3200 MP
2. Eaton 2500 MP → 2700 MP
3. Bailey 2200 MP → 2800 MP
4. Green 2100 MP → 1100 MP
5. Tripucka 1900 MP → 1000 MP + Iavaroni 1200 MP
6. Griffith 1800 MP → 1000 MP
7. Hansen 1500 MP → 1800 MP

Karl Malone took a fairly considerable jump to the basketball elite in 1988 (eighth in MVP, all-nba team and Player of the Month in March). Thurl Bailey also plays more and scores way more. There aren’t many other changes to note outside of Marc Iavaroni taking half of Kelly Tripucka‘s minutes. Which means we can conclude:

• Stockton’s increased role coincides with an increase in Utah’s offensive efficiency
• Malone’s jump as a player coincides with an increase in Utah’s offensive efficiency
• It’s not a good offense (still below league average).

Stockton then goes on to win eight more assists titles, including the single-season record of 14.5 assists per game. For the next decade, his minutes hold steady around 35 per game, with an individual Offensive Rating between 120 and 125. What happens during that period?

1. Utah’s offense jumps again in 1990 to positive (+2.2)
2. Utah’s offense flashes into the elite in 1992 (+4) for a single year
3. Utah’s offense jumps to elite in 1995 (+6) where it stays until 1998

So either John Stockton is changing his game and effectiveness with almost zero statistical shift (highly unlikely), or other factors are changing the team performance in those seasons. Looking more closely at possible explanations…

1990 – Offensive Success

This is the first full season with Jerry Sloan at the helm. Mark Eaton, who was not a good offensive player, played 600 fewer minutes, while Blue Edwards and Bob Hansen were introduced to the rotation. It seems reasonable to give some credit to Sloan, some credit to Stockton and Malone for improving a little and some credit to a slightly better offensive rotation.

1992 – A top-5 Offense

What about  the brief flash in 1992? Tyrone Corbin, David Benoit and Jeff Malone playing well could explain some of it. (Although in 1991, the Jazz offense scored 108.6 points per 100 for the season and 108.6 in the 13 games Jeff missed.) The only notable difference we see is in team offensive rebounding, where the Jazz vaulted from from 27^th to sixth.

1995 – Offensive Dominance

1995 features an obvious (and critical) addition in all-star Jeff Hornacek. Utah’s Offensive Rating with Jeff Hornacek at the end of 1994 (the last 27 games of the season) was an estimated 110.4, up from an estimated 107.9 before his arrival. That difference explains the majority of the jump to elite the Jazz offense saw in 1995. Statistically, some of it was also due to Karl Malone‘s improvements in FT% and FG%, which led to 1.08 more pts per 36 minutes from Malone just due to his increase in those two categories…worth 35% (1.3 points per 100) of the 3.7 relative points they improved in 1995.

1999 – Offensive Decline

All the while, Stockton remains statistically steady. Finally, in 1999 they drop back down to the +3 to +5 above league average range after posting the best ORtg in the league in 1998. Only 1999 isn’t the year Stockton’s minutes take a dip…it’s the year after they do.

Let me restate that: John Stockton was a 28 minute per game player in 1998, and Utah posted the best offense in the league. This is not to say that Stockton wasn’t a part of that offensive excellence, but he wasn’t a major driver of it either.

In 1999, Jeff Hornacek‘s free throw attempts drop off, a reflection of his aging legs. Utah loses Antoine Carr and the worst offensive center on its roster, Greg Ostertag, increases his minutes along with Bryon Russell. Malone clearly exits his prime at 35 after a long and infamous lockout. The old Jazz were heavily affected by a compressed schedule: They posted a 103.2 ORtg without rest and 107.7 ORtg with a day of rest. All teams are generally affected by back-to-back games, but those Jazz struggled mostly on offense, posting the 6th-largest drop in ORtg in the league on days without rest.

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In the seven postseasons Utah was at its best, John Stockton‘s TS% dropped seven times. A player noted for his efficient play saw his scoring efficiency drop catastrophically in four of his seven best chances at a championship, without any notable change or increase in any other area of his game. Overall, his TS% plummeted by 6.4% in those seven playoff runs.

One theory: John Stockton couldn’t ramp up his scoring when needed like the other great point guards of all-time (see: Magic, Oscar, Nash, Isiah, Paul, etc.). For some perspective, as a starter, Steve Nash has scored over 20 points in 43.6% of his games and over 30 in 8.2% of them, with a career-best of 48. From 1988-1998, Stockton scored over 20 in just 21.9% of games. Twice (1.6%) in that span — two out of the three games vs. Golden State in 1989 — did Stock scoring over 30, with a best of 34.

Not only does Stockton’s performance decline with the postseason, but in eliminitation games as well. In those seven aforementioned seasons, the Jazz played a whopping 17 elimination games (with an impressive 10 wins). Stockton shot over his seasonal average in TS% just five times, and posted a sub-50% TS game seven times. In those seven seasons, here are Stockton’s elimination game numbers compared to Karl Malone‘s:

Those numbers are from seasons in which Stockton averaged 13.5 ppg and 10.4 apg on 62.1% TS% while Malone averaged 26.0 ppg, 9.9 rpg and 58.7% TS. That’s a catastrophic decline from Stockton, especially as the “second option” who faced less defensive pressure than Malone.

In that time, Stockton outplayed Malone in two of the 17 elimination games, 1996 G7 vs. Seattle and 1999 G6 vs. Portland. Malone massively outplays Stockton in 1995 G5 vs. Houston, 1996 G5 and G6 vs. Seattle, 1998 G5 vs. Hou, and G5 and G6 vs. Chi in 1998.

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All told, the PS struggles for Stockton are startling. When we did this examination before, Malone had the biggest drop in TS%. What’s amazing is that if we expand the years to for him from 1988-1998, Stockton’s TS% falls even more than Malone’s (-5.3%) while his scoring remains the same at 14.9 ppg. (Malone at least improves his scoring slightly to a robust 27 points per game.) And we’re being kind to Stockton here by excluding his dreadful 1999 postseason, arguably the worst of his career, in which Utah was still a championship contender.

How do all of these numbers relate to Utah’s results in the postseason. For the purpose of focusing on Stockton’s prime, let’s ignore 1999 and 2001 and look at 1988-1998. The following numbers are changes in PPG, TS% and individual ORtg from the regular season to the postseason. Bolded numbers in Utah’s “PS Change” (postseason change relative to regular season offensive rating) are seasons in which all three categories decline:

Now let’s look at Malone:

Keen eyes will notice who correlates more to the team’s offensive performance. The change in individual ORtg correlates the strongest in both to the change in team ORtg. Stockton’s coefficient is 0.17, considered a small or weak correlation. Malone’s coefficient is 0.64, which is a moderately strong correlation. In other words, when Stockton’s numbers fluctuated it didn’t affect the team result greatly. Malone’s performance changes did.*

*The Jazz had one playoff “failure” on offense from 1988-1997, and that was a five-game series in 1993 to a significantly better Seattle team that historically gave them fits. The Sonics were also the league’s second-best defense. It was also one of two seasons Malone shows a strong statistical drop across the board. The 1998 decline in ORtg is instructional in that the Jazz actually were +4.3 before the Finals versus Chicago, which still would have resulted in a small decline from the regular season’s No. 1 offense (3.4 points down from 7.7),  only Stockton AND Jeff Hornacek grossly underperformed. Yet Malone’s excellent run through the Western Conference — - 29-11-4 on 55% TS in 11 wins — still anchored an impressive +4.3 offense with Utah’s second and third best offensive players struggling.

For some reason, Stockton’s legacy seems totally unaffected by all of this. His failures didn’t make headlines at the time…because he was never considered the superstar of the team. As his role diminished and Malone’s game polished over into two MVPs (and a strong second-place finish in between them), the Jazz blossomed, posting its best offensive seasons and challenging for multiple titles. Despite all this, they are often considered equals. In a 2008 list, the popular SLAM magazine ranked Stockton the 22nd-best player of all-time…just four spots behind Malone. Bill Simmon’s, in his popular Book of Basketball, slotted Stockton 25th and Malone 18th. In the ultimate reflection of their reputations, Reggie Miller took Stockton ahead of a number of contemporaries who were considered significantly better in this all-time draft…including his own teammate, Karl Malone!

It’s unclear why their legacies have been shaped this way. They could be rooted in a Blame-Game — Malone made the headlines so Stockton went unscathed. They could be rooted in popularity — the mild-manner Stockton is widely beloved and respected. They just aren’t rooted in reality.